Western New England Law Review
Volume 33 33 (2011)
Issue 2 SYMPOSIUM: FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
THE CLOSELY HELD FIRM 35 YEARS AFTER
WILKES V. SPRINGSIDE NURSING HOME

Article 11

1-1-2011

CLOSE CORPORATION REMEDIES AND
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLOSELY HELD
FIRM
Larry E. Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Larry E. Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law, CLOSE CORPORATION REMEDIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CLOSELY HELD FIRM, 33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 531 (2011), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/11

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE210.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

27-SEP-11

10:19

CLOSE CORPORATION REMEDIES AND
THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CLOSELY HELD FIRM
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the law of closely held firms from an
evolutionary perspective. The corporate tax and constraints on the
availability of limited liability forced closely held firms to compro
mise their planning objectives and choose standard forms that did
not fully reflect their needs. These planning problems forced courts
to construct duties and remedies that did not relate to the parties’
contracts. The famous close corporation case of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 1 classically illustrates this problem. The
advent and spread of the limited liability company significantly in
creased the availability of suitable standard forms for closely held
firms. As a result, courts now can focus on fully effectuating the
parties’ contracts rather than creating remedies the parties may not
have wanted. This analysis has implications for potential improve
ments in contracting for closely held firms.
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INTRODUCTION
Business associations are complex and long-term contracts for
which detailed planning is inherently difficult. Statutes and flexible
judicial gap-filling often supplement explicit contracts in this con
text.2 The development of business association statutes depends
on the general legal and economic environment over time. The
availability of improved statutes, in turn, affects both the parties’
contracts and the nature of appropriate judicial remedies.
The most significant changes in the law of business associations
over the last thirty years relate to small firms. During this period,
business forms for closely held firms evolved from the general part
nership and close corporation to the dominance of the flexible lim
ited liability form.3 Closely held firms had to choose between the
higher transaction costs of these earlier forms and the higher tax or
liability costs of standard forms better tailored to small firms’
needs.4 This compromise compounded the inherent problems of
high-cost customized planning in small firms. As a result, small
firms became wards of the courts, with judges rewriting their
agreements.5
2. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 15-38 (2010) (dis
cussing the role and function of business association law).
3. A recent study shows that in 2007 approximately two-thirds of business forma
tions were LLCs. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the
United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006,
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010).
4. RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, 95-117.
5. See id.
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The 1997 “check-the-box” tax rules6 set in motion a fundamen
tal change in closely held firms. These rules freed small firms to
adopt standard forms that suited their needs and motivated state
legislatures to modify their laws accordingly. The resulting explo
sion of statutes and private contracts reshaped small firms and
changed the courts’ role in adjudicating cases involving these firms.
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 7 illustrates the
changes in the law of closely held firms. The Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court confronted businessmen whose contract was
hopelessly unsuited to their business relationship. Like many other
small firms of the time, this was a partnership wrapped in a corpo
ration. Although the firm had all the trappings of a coequal rela
tionship among active participants, it lacked the partnership
mechanism for resolving the disputes that inevitably arise in such a
relationship. The court had to decide between leaving the parties
to stew in their imperfect planning and rescuing them by rewriting
their agreement. The court did the latter, creating confusion for
business people but delight for generations of law professors.
This Article discusses the coming of age of small firms in three
distinct stages marked by important legal developments which re
duced small firms’ contracting costs and increased their opportunity
to adopt suitable agreements. In the first stage, most closely held
firms were general partnerships, a form that is designed for the
smallest firms.
In the second stage, the growing importance of limited liability
caused many small firms to incorporate while keeping their partner
ship characteristics. Wilkes shows that this was an unhappy com
promise that necessitated judicial intervention into the parties’
contracts. While courts and legislatures loosened the constraints on
the close corporation form, this loosening did little to help firms
like the nursing home in Wilkes because it required small firms to
do costly planning in order to remodel the corporate form to suit
their needs. The application of the corporate tax to corporate-like
firms deterred firms and legislatures from taking the logical step of
adopting limited liability business forms designed for partnershiptype firms.
The third stage was heralded by the adoption of “check-the
box” taxation, which finally eliminated the tax constraints on small
firms’ choice of business form. This change opened the floodgates
6.
7.

See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to 2 (1960).
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
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for the limited liability company (LLC), which proved to be the
flexible limited liability form small firms were looking for. Small
firms could have the contracts they wanted without tax concerns.
This reduced the need for judicial interference in the governance of
closely held firms and led to the application of more contract-based
judicial remedies.
As we will see, the next step is up to lawyers, courts, and legis
latures. Lawyers need to help their clients take advantage of the
planning flexibility the law now gives them. Courts should more
explicitly recognize the contractual nature of remedies for oppres
sion and deadlock. Public and private lawmakers need to provide
business people with a more complete set of standard forms.
This Article begins by discussing the small firm’s infancy as a
general partnership, whose default rules suited only the very small
est firms. Part II discusses the small firm’s adolescence in the era of
the close corporation, when firms had to choose between limited
liability and the contractual freedom available to general partner
ships. Part III discusses the small firm’s adulthood as limited liabil
ity companies, with the ability to choose from a range of standard
forms and state laws. The Article then shows how this evolution of
business forms has affected judicial dissolution remedies in recent
LLC cases. Part V discusses the implications of potential future
evolution in small firms’ contracting technology.
I. INFANCY: GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
The earliest small firms were partnerships, which began as inti
mate, usually family, relationships.8 They were referred to as “com
pagnia,” which means those sharing bread, reflecting their origins in
households.9 Kinship ties were an important mechanism for con
trolling agency costs. As Kerim Bey told James Bond in From Rus
sia with Love, “all of my key employees are my sons. Blood is the
best security in this business.”10 Partnership law reflects this inti
macy in several ways.11 First, each partner is vicariously liable for
8. See Avner Greif, The Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational
Forms through History: Reflections from the Late Medieval Family Firm, 5 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 473, 476 n.2 (1996).
9. See id. at 489; Meir G. Kohn, Business Organization in Pre-Industrial Europe
33, (Dartmouth Coll. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 03-09, 2003), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=427744.
10. Memorable Quotes for From Russia with Love, THE INTERNET MOVIE
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057076/quotes (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
11. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 39-64.
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all of the firm’s debts. This liability, which is imposed irrespective
of the partnership agreement, reinforces the need for intimacy and
the other rights discussed below.
Second, partnership default rules are designed for the smallest
firms, with provisions for equality in profit and loss sharing,12 vot
ing,13 and partners’ power to block important acts14 and to bind the
firm.15
Third, traditional partnership fiduciary duties reflect partner
ship’s intimacy. In the famous case of Meinhard v. Salmon, Justice
Cardozo described the partner’s duty as “the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive.”16 The court’s application of the duty to the
defendant under the facts of that case—that is, for failing to include
plaintiff in a much bigger deal the defendant was offered because of
his superior skills—seems to assume the sort of close-knit relation
ship in which the parties share everything like brothers.
Fourth, partners have no default power to transfer their man
agement rights in the partnership without their co-partners’ con
sent.17 This follows from partners’ default management rights and
vicarious liability, since partners would want to control who holds
these strong powers.
Fifth, the Uniform Partnership Act allows any partner to dis
solve a partnership that has no remaining agreed term simply by
expressing the will to do so or dissociating from the firm.18 When
this happens the partnership liquidates.19 Even if the partnership
has a remaining agreed term, it can still be dissolved and forced to
liquidate by any partner other than one who acted wrongfully
(under the original U.P.A.)20 or by half the remaining partners
(under the Revised U.P.A.).21 Partnership law further encourages
dissolution and liquidation by traditionally restricting inter-partner
litigation to an accounting, which typically happens only at dissolu
tion.22 These rules leave partners subject to the risk that their co
12. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (1997); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914).
13. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(f); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(e).
14. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 (j); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(h).
15. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9.
16. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
17. See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 26, 27.
18. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31.
19. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 38.
20. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 38(2).
21. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(2).
22. The accounting is provided for in UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 28. The rule that the
accounting is the exclusive remedy is a case law development. See 2 ALAN R. BROM
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partners will use the dissolution power to walk off with valuable
skills and assets. For example, in Page v. Page a managing brother
used dissolution to essentially take the business from his brother
who had invested heavily in it and was only just beginning to see a
payoff.23 This risk of opportunism is justified by a strong assump
tion that the parties did not expect the firm to survive serious disa
greement, litigation, or member departure.
Although the above default rules are appropriate only for the
smallest and most intimate firms, many small firms consist of arms’
length relationships and some passive investors. These firms need a
business form better suited to their needs, particularly including
limited liability and greater continuity. As we will see in the next
part, firms seeking limited liability traditionally have been chan
neled into the corporate form, which poses different but equally
daunting problems for small firms.
II. ADOLESCENT IDENTITY CRISIS: THE CLOSE CORPORATION
Small firms seeking to leave the intimacy contemplated by gen
eral partnership law and venture into the world needed a different
legal vehicle. The corporate form’s limited liability became increas
ingly valuable as firms’ tort liabilities expanded during the twenti
eth century. But the corporation was designed for large firms, with
features such as significant separation between management and
ownership, complex capital structures, and publicly tradable
shares.24 The closely held corporation was a contradiction in terms,
as its nickname “incorporated partnership” suggests.25 Even
closely held firm owners dissatisfied with the intimacy of the part
nership form did not necessarily want to go to the other extreme of
corporate-type boards of directors and formal shareholder meet
ings. These people needed a limited liability firm that combined
partnership and corporate aspects under the partnership heading.
Although states were free to develop such statutes, they did
not do so. Tax law helps explain why. A firm taxed as a corpora
tion under Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code has to pay
taxes at the firm level when it earns income and at the owner level
when it distributes the income as dividends.26 A partnership taxed
&
(2011).
23.
24.
25.
26.

BERG

LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN
Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 42 (Cal. 1961).
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 65-75.
See id. at 96.
I.R.C. § 301 (2006).

ON

PARTNERSHIP, § 6.08(c)
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under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code could avoid a
separate tax on entity-level income because it was not a separate
entity for tax purposes.27 This was usually better than the “double”
corporate tax, especially for closely held partnership-type firms that
tend to distribute most of their cash to the owners.28 But partner
ships that adopted limited liability were stuck with the corporate
tax. The “Kintner regulations,”29 which defined what the tax code
called “associations,”30 subjected firms to the corporate tax if they
had certain supposed entity characteristics, including limited liabil
ity.31 As the IRS applied the regulations, the corporate tax became
essentially a tax on limited liability.32
These tax rules left limited liability firms with little demand for
“limited liability partnership”-type business forms. If the firms
were going to be taxed as corporations, they might be better off
with standard entity features, such as separation of management
and control to manage retained earnings and continuity of life, to
protect against taxable distributions of these earnings. In any
event, small firm owners could limit the tax costs of incorporation
by maximizing their tax deductions. The fact that corporate tax
rates were lower than individual rates mitigated the effect of the
remaining double corporate tax. The lack of demand for the lim
ited liability partnership gave state legislatures little incentive to
supply it.
Congress also actively channeled small firms into the corporate
form by enacting Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code in
1958, which enabled small corporations to get many of the tax ad
vantages of partnership.33 Congress significantly loosened the re
27. Id. § 701.
28. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 96.
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2004). These were named for the case of United
States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
30. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘corporation’ includes associations
. . . .”); id. § 7701(a)(2) (definition of “partnership”).
31. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 100.
32. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (Nov. 17, 1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301)
(announcing that any firm would be classified as a corporation if all of its members have
limited liability). The rule was withdrawn two years later. IRS News Release, Dec. 16,
1982; I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30 (Jan. 14, 1983). However, the IRS
issued a private letter ruling classifying an LLC as a corporation, before announcing
that it would not issue further private rulings concerning LLC classification. Compare
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982), with Rev. Proc. 83-15, 1983-1 C.B. 676
(1983).
33. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379.

R
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quirements in 198234 and 199635 while, at the same time, states were
making the limited partnership a viable alternative to incorpora
tion, the consequences of partnership taxation were becoming more
favorable, and political pressure was increasing to abandon the sep
arate corporate tax.36 Subchapter S attempts to keep small firms in
the corporate fold by offering them a simple and straightforward
alternative to the complexities of Subchapter K.37 Subchapter S’s
one-class-of-stock requirement38 restricts these corporations from
using complex capital structures that could enable high tax bracket
owners to shift income to those in lower tax brackets.
Courts also accommodated the close corporation form. After
initially refusing to adjust corporate norms to fit closely held firms,
courts took account of the increasing number of close corporations
and started to enforce their agreements.39 But closely held firms
faced limits in the extent to which they could remodel the corporate
form. For example, Clark v. Dodge enforced an agreement eroding
the power of a board to decide on distributions and who would be
the firm’s general manager, but only because the board retained
some power to determine whether the manager was providing good
service and dividends were appropriate.40 Also, courts were willing
to enforce a shareholder voting agreement that departed a little
from corporate-style one share one vote,41 but not one that looked
too much like a statutory voting trust.42
34. See Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669
(1982).
35. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1301,
110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)) (raising the number of permissi
ble members from 35 to 75). The statute was further amended in 2004 to increase the
number from 75 to 100. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.L. 108-357, § 232(a),
118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)).
36. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 342-47 (1995); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory
of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 940 (2006) (noting that Subchapter S
“narrowed the base of companies subject to the separate corporate tax rather than
threatening the system itself”).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2004); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 17:3 (2d ed. 2008).
38. I.R.C. § 1361 (b)(1)(D).
39. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Cor
poration Law, 5 BERK. BUS. L.J. 263, 292 (2008).
40. Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
41. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 49 A.2d
603 (Del. 1946).
42. Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957).
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Despite the courts’ and Uncle Sam’s best efforts to herd closely
held firms into the corporate corral, the close corporation ulti
mately was an evolutionary dead end. The problem came in deal
ing with agreements that did not fully anticipate the problems that
arose on breakup or exit. Enforcing partnership-type direct control
by individual members or factions creates a need for partnershiptype mechanisms for settling the inevitable disputes among mem
bers. Yet close corporations that failed to plan for breakup were
stuck with corporate default rules that locked feuding members into
a permanent entity without hope of selling their shares on the open
market or enabled a controlling faction to force a frozen-in owner
to sell out at a bargain price.
Although courts at first held they had no inherent power to
dissolve in these situations, legislatures amended the statutes to
give courts this power.43 Then the courts had to decide individual
cases. The problem for the courts is that there are both costs and
benefits of enabling members to exit firms, and the balance de
pends on particular firms’ needs. Statutes can do no more than pro
vide default rules that at least roughly fit many firms’ expectations
and that provide suitable platforms for contracting. Default rules
cannot precisely anticipate the needs of the range of firms that do
not have contracts. More importantly, it is not clear what a firm
wants when it decides to be a corporation but looks like a partner
ship. This leaves close corporations that do not have agreements
even worse off than partnerships that do not have agreements.
The freeze-out scenario illustrates the problems of close corpo
rations. We have seen that the partnership feature of dissolution
at-will may enable a partner to opportunistically seize value that co
partners help create.44 Partnership statutes craft a rough compro
mise that lets partners escape most partnerships while providing for
continuity in partnerships for an agreed term.45 In this situation
partners are particularly likely to have investments tied up in the
firm. It is much less clear what the parties to a close corporation
wanted when the corporation statute simultaneously tells the par
ties they lack the power to exit at will but then empowers courts to
allow exit in some cases. An early commentator praised a court
that denied dissolution where opportunism might have been a prob
43. See Carlos Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778 (1952).
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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lem.46 But the parties may not have wanted to be locked together
in the firm either.
State close corporation law has advanced from its earliest days,
particularly regarding break-up, and particularly by enactment of
statutes like that in New York, which lets holders of 20% or more
of the corporation’s shares petition for dissolution for looting,
waste, or “illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions” by those in con
trol.47 In re Kemp & Beatley permitted dissolution under this provi
sion where close corporation managers denied distributions to
former employees that had formerly been given to all shareholders
because this frustrated their “reasonable expectations.”48
The oppression remedy, as applied in cases like Kemp &
Beatley, arguably improves on the remedies available at the time of
Wilkes.49 However, the remedy does not significantly alleviate the
essential indeterminacy inherent in firms that are neither quite cor
porations nor partnerships. The problem is that it is not clear what
shareholders reasonably expect when neither the statute nor the
agreement provides for dissolution. Should shareholders get spe
cial rights just because they are also employees, or should employ
ees get special rights because they are also shareholders?50 Should
owners who are former employees be entitled to distributions just
because everybody got them when everybody was both a share
holder and an employee? Does it matter that making payments to
non-employees could cause all of the firm’s payouts to be character
ized as taxable dividends rather than tax-deductible salaries? Did
the shareholders expect a buyout in this situation? If not, should
the buyout price reflect continuation of distributions? Given these
ambiguities, a dissolution standard based on the parties’ “reasona
ble expectations” invites courts to make up contracts for the par
ties. This problem is not helped by statutory provisions permitting
46. See Abram Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1546-47 (1960).
47. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. § 1104–a (McKinney 2003).
48. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (N.Y. 1984).
49. See Robert A. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contract and Judges in the
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011).
50. Five years after Kemp, the New York Court of Appeals refused to give a
cause of action for improper termination to a fired employee who was also a minority
shareholder and was paid pursuant to his employment agreement. See Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312-13 (N.Y. 1989). The court reasoned
that “[i]t is necessary in this case to appreciate and keep distinct the duty a corporation
owes to a minority shareholder as a shareholder from any duty it might owe him as an
employee.” Id. at 1313. A strong dissent relied on Kemp, as well as Pace and Wilkes
discussed below, among other cases. Id. at 1315 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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parties opposing dissolution to buy out the plaintiff at fair value,51
since it is not clear why the plaintiff should be entitled to exit just
because he sues, or on what assumptions the court should base its
determination of “fair value.”
The indeterminacy of close corporation law is especially evi
dent when the oppression remedy meets an actual contract. For
example, in In re Pace Photographers, Ltd., the parties agreed that
a stockholder who “desires to sell his shares” could sell to the other
stockholders at a below-market formula price. 52 Petitioner sued to
dissolve for oppression and his co-shareholders offered to buy peti
tioner’s stock for the agreed price pursuant to the New York provi
sion.53 The court held that the contractual buyout provision only
applied to a voluntary offer to sell or shareholder death and not to
a statutory dissolution proceeding in the absence of explicit lan
guage to that effect.54 Plaintiff therefore could avoid the buyout
price by suing for dissolution rather than offering his shares for
sale.55 Although the provision’s interaction with the statute was
ambiguous, the court compounded the problem by making little ef
fort to reconcile the two.56
At least in the above New York cases, the parties might be said
to have implicitly adopted the statutory remedy. Things get messier
in a state like Massachusetts which lacks such a provision. In the
famous Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the court allowed a mi
nority holder the same opportunity for a buyout that the controlling
shareholder got in connection with an estate planning reshuffling of
interests.57 It is not clear why a 20% holder who declined to invest
in the business should get the same opportunity as the controlling
shareholder who had invested and run the business, particularly
where there was neither an agreement that entitled the minority
holder to this valuable right of being able to “tag along” with the
majority owner’s sale, nor a statute providing for judicial
dissolution.
This brings us to the follow-up to Donahue, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., which involved a situation similar to
Kemp—that is, a former employee who claims to have been shut
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. § 1118.
In re Pace Photographers, Ltd., 525 N.E.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. 1988).
Id. at 715.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 717-18.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 520-21 (Mass. 1975).
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out of employment and other benefits that he expected from his
investment.58 Wilkes involved even harder facts than Kemp since,
while Gardstein quit, Wilkes was fired, apparently without cause.59
Moreover, the parties seem to have thought harder in Wilkes about
what their deal was—they clearly wanted to be partners, and were
incorporated only for liability reasons.60 In other words, they
squarely faced the classic tradeoff between limited liability and
partnership discussed above.
Whatever the parties in Wilkes might subjectively have wanted,
what they did was incorporate,which seemingly subjected them to
the corporate statute. The result was the structural dissonance of a
“partnership” in corporate form. This is a hybrid business associa
tion with no clear default rules. For example, if this firm really was
a partnership, Wilkes could have sued for dissolution as an ex
cluded partner rather than being left with only a suit for back pay.61
If it was not, then Wilkes at that time in Massachusetts had no stat
utory remedy. The parties could not even have counted on the
Donahue rule, since that case was decided only a year before
Wilkes.62 As in Donahue, the court spun a contract out of gossa
mer expectations, and gave Wilkes the salary he would have made
had he stayed employed.63 Wilkes’s status as a shareholder some
how also got him a guarantee of employment even without a con
tract to that effect.64
States tried to improve the close corporation contracting tech
nology by enacting special statutes that explicitly validated partnership-type agreements in close corporations.65 Small firms might
have been expected to gravitate to these provisions, particularly
once courts used the statutes to develop a special jurisprudence that
58. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass.
19876).
59. Id. at 661.
60. Id. at 659.
61. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, § 7.06(c) (discussing types of mis
conduct that can serve as a ground of judicial dissolution in general partnerships).
62. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505.
63. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 665.
64. Indeed, Deborah DeMott’s contribution to this symposium characterizes
Wilkes as changing the traditional default rule of employment at will. See Deborah A.
DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 497 (2011).
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 341–356 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS’NS §§ 4–101 to 4–603 (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31 (2009);
MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2008).
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differed from corporations.66 But this did not happen. Small firms
wanted to be real partnerships rather than ersatz partnerships in
corporate form. Despite the special close corporation provisions
and the structural similarities between close corporations and part
nerships, general corporation law arguably still applied to small cor
porations that did not contract explicitly or that failed to elect and
qualify under the close corporation provisions.67 Some courts have
had a hard time accepting this. They continue to analogize close
corporations to partnerships, though it is not clear what this
means.68 They still do not trust the parties’ choices even as these
choices become more explicit. For example, Zion v. Kurtz held that
a corporation could qualify for Delaware’s special close corporation
treatment even if it failed to make the requisite statutory election.69
Few firms ultimately opted for special close corporation sta
70
tus. Small firms recognized that these statutes were an uneasy
compromise because, whether or not the firms were essentially
partnerships, they faced costs as long as they were called corpora
tions, “close,” or otherwise. The expectations of firms that oper
ated in the corporate form never quite matched the default
agreement the legislation supplied, and the courts could not fill this
gap. As discussed in the next section, small firms fled the corporate
form altogether as soon as the tax laws were changed to eliminate
the need for compromise.
III. FINDING

A

ROLE MODEL: THE LLC

The migration to LLCs that transformed the closely held firm
began with tax reform in the 1980s.71 By the mid-1980s only two
states (Wyoming in 1977 and Florida in 1982) had adopted LLC
66. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 365 (1992).
67. For cases denying judicial remedies designed for closely held firms that did
not elect to be treated as statutory close corporations see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993); Toner v. Balt. Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 653-54 (Md.
1985).
68. See Pappas v. Fotinos, No. 7799/04, 2010 WL 2891194, at *12-13 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. July 23, 2010); Larry E. Ribstein, A Corporation is not a Partnership, TRUTH ON THE
MARKET (Aug. 2, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/02/a-corporation-is-not
a-partnership/.
69. Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 682 (N.Y. 1980).
70. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.20 (2008); Wells, supra note
39, at 279-81 (discussing data on close corporation formations).
71. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Exter
nalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.79, 86-87 (2001).
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statutes.72 But three events helped change the political equilib
rium.73 First, the Tax Reform Act of 198674 reduced top individual
tax rates below top corporate tax rates and eliminated favorable
capital gains treatment, thereby making corporate taxation costly
for almost all firms.75
Second, Georgia’s 1988 passage of a new limited partnership
act allowed limited partners to fully participate in the control aspect
of the partnership without having personal liability.76 The Georgia
statute forced the IRS to decide whether a limited partnership with
managing limited partners could be a tax partnership.77 An affirm
ative answer would force the IRS to decide whether an LLC, which
has no general partners, also could be a tax partnership. If the IRS
refused to accommodate the Georgia limited partnership, it would
have had to define the level of control and liability the general part
ners needed to have for the firm to be taxed as a partnership. Al
though the IRS delayed a ruling on the tax status of the Georgia
statute,78 the day of reckoning with these issues was approaching.
A third key event in the evolution of the LLC was when Con
gress decided to characterize publicly traded partnerships as corpo
rations.79 Congress sought with this provision to head off mass
disincorporations of corporations into limited partnerships intended
to take advantage of the reduction of personal income tax rates.
The law also lifted the burden of preventing this result from the tax
classification rules.
These events set the stage for a 1988 Internal Revenue Service
ruling classifying a limited liability company—that is, a non-corpo
rate firm all of whose members had limited liability—as a tax part
nership.80 Within six years all but three states had adopted LLC
statutes.81 The states continued tinkering with the provisions to
press against the limits of the tax classification rules. By the end of
72. Id. at 86.
73. The following discussion of the three events is drawn from Ribstein, supra
note 2, at 120-22.
74. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
75. See Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years,
2 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 117-18 (1988).
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9A-2 (2003).
77. Ribstein, supra note 2, at 121.
78. See Rev. Rul. 91-51, 1991-2 C.B. 434.
79. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2008).
80. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
81. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37, § 1:2.
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the 1990s, all states had adopted LLC statutes.82 The IRS gave up
trying to distinguish between tax partnerships and tax corporations
and adopted the “check-the-box” rule which allowed non-publicly
traded firms to decide whether they wanted to be taxed as partner
ships or corporations.83 Governance structure was now separated
from tax structure. LLCs could adopt corporate-type governance
and still be subject to the partnership tax, or they could remain
partnership-type firms under state law while electing to be taxed as
corporations under Subchapter S or Subchapter C of the Internal
Revenue Code.84
LLC statutes have continued to evolve after adoption of checkthe-box. States are evidently competing in a race to keep local
firms from fleeing to Delaware’s sophisticated lawyers and courts.85
Since firms now could adopt corporate-type terms without fear of
subjecting themselves to the corporate double tax, the LLC could
finally evolve into the flexible mix of corporate and partnership fea
tures small firms had always wanted instead of having to choose
between the intimate general partnership and the unwieldy corpo
ration.86 Among other things, LLC statutes included default provi
sions for centralized management and for pro rata sharing of
management and financial rights, in contrast to the equal rights in
partnership law. States also amended their LLC statutes to provide
that, unlike partnerships, LLCs no longer dissolved because of the
exit of a single member. These moves facilitated the creation of
corporate-type entities that delegated power to managers and to
controlling shareholders.
The evidence concerning state competition for LLCs87 suggests
that this competition revolves around three general formats. Dela
ware dominates the market for larger LLCs, perhaps because these
firms value Delaware’s flexible statute and sophisticated planning.
Many states compete to encourage local firms not to form in Dela
ware by giving them Delaware-type flexibility. The remaining
states that are not actively innovating and offering mainly uniform
rules may be trying to offer local small firms enough default rules
82. Id.
83. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-3 (2004).
84. Perhaps surprisingly, many LLCs have chosen the latter course. See Chrisman, supra note 3, at 480-83.
85. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Juris
dictional Competition for LLCs, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91.
86. See Ribstein, supra note 2, at 137-92 (discussing features of modern LLCs).
87. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 85.
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and judicial protection so that their members do not have to engage
in costly planning or worry about being victimized by improvident
agreements.
IV. MATURITY
The full statutory recognition of LLCs gave closely held firms a
robust contracting platform and thereby enabled them to avoid the
uncertainty created by close corporation cases like Wilkes. Closely
held firms now can choose statutes that accommodate their con
tracting needs without having to compromise these objectives to get
limited liability and favorable tax treatment. This enabled courts to
focus on full-fledged enforcement of the parties’ contracts rather
than on general statutory oppression standards. This Part shows
how courts have responded by analyzing recent LLC judicial disso
lution cases.
A. Judicial Dissolution in LLCs and Close Corporations
Judicial remedies continue to be necessary in LLCs as in close
corporations because, as in all firms, managers, and controlling
owners may exercise power that can be abused, and because LLC
statutes either do not provide for any default exit right or deny a
leaving partner the right to a buyout of her interest. A dissociated
LLC member often is left, sometimes unexpectedly, with a nonmanaging equity interest.88 LLC statutes eliminated partnershiptype default exit-at-will after “check-the-box” enabled LLCs to
have corporate-type continuity of life without having to worry
about being taxed like corporations. Family firms’ incentive to re
duce estate and gift taxes also spurred the new provisions. The tax
code provides that valuation of partnership interests can take ac
count of statutory restrictions on liquidation rights but not those
imposed merely by agreement.89 Even without this tax incentive,
many LLCs would want to restrict exit to protect against draining
cash for buyouts or to reduce the risk of member opportunism of
the sort discussed above in connection with Page v. Page.90
88. In some cases such provisions have caused particular and unexpected hard
ship. See Holdeman v. Epperson, 857 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio 2006) (involving estate of de
ceased member); Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 208 P.3d 1296 (Wyo. 2009) (protracted
litigation concerning rights of a dissociated member frozen into an economic-only
interest).
89. See I.R.C. § 2704 (2008).
90. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Without a cash-out right, LLC members need a default judicial
exit route to protect them from oppression by controlling holders.91
Most LLC statutes, including Delaware92 and New York,93 author
ize judicial dissolution only “when[ ] it is not reasonably practicable
to carry on the business in conformity with the” parties’ agreement,
with a minority of states adding close corporation-type oppression
grounds.94
Even without these statutory provisions, courts likely would
apply flexible remedies that do not relegate the parties to the literal
contractual language. This conclusion does not rest on behavioral
psychology, norms, or other reasons for hesitating to enforce con
tracts.95 Rather, it simply recognizes the costs and infeasibility of
contracting for every contingency in long term contracts.96 As dis
cussed below,97 this approach to interpretation is consistent with
standard contractual rules such as the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. It assumes that rational contracting parties
recognize the limits of their foresight—that is, have “bounded
rationality.”98
B. Analysis of LLC Judicial Dissolution Cases
Closely held firms’ evolution from close corporations to LLCs
means courts can now take more seriously express contracts and
statutory default rules. I do not suggest, as Robert Thompson as
91. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company:
Learning (Or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 968
(2005).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2005).
93. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 702 (McKinney 2010).
94. Id.; see Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where are Limited Liability
Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis app. III, tbl. 10a-d (Revised June 28, 2010)
(Univ. of Tex. School of Law, Law and Economics Research, Paper No. 126, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633472 (tabulating LLC statutory dissolution
remedies); Thompson, supra note 49.
95. See Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression
Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010) (analyzing these considerations in relation to
close corporation oppression remedies but concluding that the remedies are justified on
contractual grounds).
96. Id. at 1166.
97. See infra Part IV.D.2.
98. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in MODELS
OF MAN, SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BE
HAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETTING 99 (1957); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Ration
ality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Oliver
E. Williamson, The Economies Of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87
AM. J. SOC. 548, 553-54 (1981).
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serts,99 that LLC statutes eliminate the need for judicial gap-filling.
No statute or agreement can cover all the contingencies involved in
a complex and open-ended contract like a business association. My
point instead is that, by providing a clearly non-corporate structure
of default rules and a variety of state statutes, LLCs make it easier
than close corporations for parties to reach agreements that ap
proximate their ex ante expectations. Courts can then fill in the
gaps using the contract and statute as general guidelines rather than
having to construct a contract from a whole cloth as in Wilkes.
Judicial opinions in close corporations tend to proceed from a
generalized notion of what the minority shareholder expected from
the deal—that is, the ability to get distributions or salary, without
regard to the express and implied contract terms. By contrast,
courts in LLC cases increasingly have focused on what parties actu
ally put in their contracts, interpreted in light of the statutory stan
dard form they used as a basis for their business agreement.
Instead of asking what reasonable parties would want if they could
contract cheaply, courts now tend to ask what the specific parties
actually wanted given what they contracted for.
LLC cases reflect this subtle but important difference from
close corporation law even under LLC statutory provisions that re
semble traditional close corporation language. For example,
Decker v. Decker dissolved a firm for a member’s misbehavior in
deliberately sabotaging an “I cut you choose” buy-sell agree
ment.100 Although the court applied close-corporation-type op
pression language in the Wisconsin LLC statute,101 its holding was
consistent with a standard contractual good faith analysis of block
ing behavior intended to thwart the expected operation of a con
tractual provision. Also, Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Development,
LLC, applying the “unfairly prejudicial” basis of judicial dissolu
tionin the North Dakota statute,102 denied plaintiff a forced buyout
on the ground that the plaintiff could reasonably expect only more
information and an opportunity to participate in decision-making
rather than continued employment in the firm.103 And Horning v.
Horning Construction, LLC denied a locked-in member’s request
for judicial dissolution because the statute had no default exit right,
99. Thompson, supra note 49.
100. Decker v. Decker, 726 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
101. Id. at 669; see also WIS. STAT. § 183.0902 (2002).
102. Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC, No. 1:04-cv-079, 2006 WL 2433410, at
*31 (D.N.D. Aug. 16, 2006).
103. Id. at *40
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noting that the legislature had deliberately restricted exit in the
statute.104
The Delaware/New York-type judicial dissolution standard105
gives courts more reason to focus on the parties’ contracts by re
quiring the courts to consider whether the parties can carry on the
firm “in conformity with” the parties’ agreement. Recent Delaware
and New York cases illustrate the enhanced role of the agreement
under this provision. In Fisk Ventures, LLC. v. Segal, an investor
used its veto power under the operating agreement to refuse to per
mit additional funding of a biotech firm that would have diluted its
interest.106 Delaware Chancellor Chandler held that the resulting
deadlock made it “not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi
ness in conformity with a limited liability company agreement”
under the Delaware LLC Act.107 The court’s attention to the con
tract language is evident from its refusal to force the investor to
resort to his put right to avoid the deadlock.108 The court noted
that the investor had a contractual right not to exercise the put right
and reasoned:
If . . . deadlock cannot be remedied through a legal mechanism
set forth within the four corners of the operating agreement, dis
solution becomes the only remedy available as a matter of law.
The Court is in no position to redraft the LLC Agreement for
these sophisticated and well-represented parties.109

Lola Cars International, Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, applied
the Fisk standard in similarly denying a motion to dismiss a dissolu
tion action under the same Delaware provision.110 The court again
held that the plaintiff did not have to exercise voluntary buyout and
104. Horning v. Horning Constr., LLC, 816 N.Y.S.2d 877, 818-83 (Sup. 2006).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 92-104; infra text accompanying notes
106-137.
106. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957, *1-2 (Del. Ch.
2009). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Reconciling Oppression with an LLC Agree
ment, IDEOBLOG (Jan. 27, 2009), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/01/recon
ciling-oppression-with-an-llc-agreement.html (discussing Fisk Ventures case).
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (West 2011).
108. Fisk Ventures, LLC, 2009 WL 73957, at *5.
109. Id. at *6.
110. Lola Cars Int’l, Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, No. C.A. Nos. 44-79-VCN, 4886
VCN, 2009 WL 4052681, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009); for further discussion, see
Larry E. Ribstein, Contracting for Termination of an LLC, IDEOBLOG (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/12/contracting-for-termination-of-an-llc.
html.
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termination rights to avoid dissolution.111 The court interpreted the
contractual termination provision as not displacing the statutory
dissolution remedy, reasoning that
the Operating Agreement nowhere requires that a member ter
minate the Operating Agreement solely in accord with its stipu
lated termination provisions. Thus, the Court cannot conclude
that these terms are exclusive. It simply cannot be true that a
number of nonexclusive, permissive termination clauses in the
Operating Agreement can preclude judicial dissolution as pro
vided for in the Act.112

The court ultimately denied dissolution after trial, again relying
on the operating agreement:
The Court concludes by emphasizing that a party to a limited
liability company agreement may not seek judicial dissolution
simply as a means of freeing Lola itself from what it considers a
bad deal. This is so even if the Member Parties’ relationship
has—as here, due largely to pressure applied by Lola both within
and without the litigation context—been badly damaged. En
dorsing such a rule would allow for one party—unfairly—to de
feat the reasonable expectations of its counterparty. Moreover,
the Member Parties in their private ordering effort embraced a
provision within the Operating Agreement that allows for disen
tanglement. . . . [I]t is not for the Court to terminate, or rewrite,
the Operating Agreement.113

In Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, Vice Chancellor Strine ordered
the dissolution of an LLC owned in equal shares by television per
sonality Bob Vila and businessman George Hill.114 Although the
operating agreement required both owners’ consent to all business
decisions,115 the owners had fundamental disagreements about the
111. Lola Cars Int’l, Ltd., 2009 WL 4052681, at *6 (“The Operating Agreement
provides a buy-out mechanism in the event of a member dispute; this self-help disentan
glement provision, however, is entirely voluntary.”).
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Lola Cars Int’l, Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, No. C.A. Nos. 44-79-VCN, 4886
VCN, 2010 WL 3314484, at *24 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2010) (footnotes omitted). The court
explained its apparent change of heart from the denial of the motion to dismiss by
noting that the level of managerial misconduct proved at trial fell short of the com
plaint’s allegations, which bore on the practicability of continuing the LLC. Id. at *24
n.275. However, it is not clear how this misconduct mattered under the court’s earlier
expectations-based analysis.
114. Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, No. C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *19
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010).
115. Id. at *2.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE210.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 21

27-SEP-11

EVOLUTION OF THE CLOSELY HELD FIRM

10:19

551

direction of the business,116 and Vila had terminated the license for
his intellectual property that the firm needed to operate.117 The
court ordered dissolution despite the company’s continued earn
ings.118 As in the above cases, the court applied the parties’ agree
ment rather than ad hoc equitable principles.119 V.C. Strine
reasoned that
[w]hat Hill wishes to do is to pursue a business having nothing to
do with the basic purpose for which WebTies was formed and to
do so over the objection of one of its two managers. Of course,
the existence of a deadlock would not necessarily justify a disso
lution if the LLC Agreement provided a means to resolve it equi
tably. But the LLC Agreement does not contain a buy-sell
arrangement or any other provision (such as one providing for
the appointment of an agreed-upon third manager) to resolve the
deadlock. Rather, the LLC Agreement contemplates that a
member or manager may seek judicial dissolution. This is what
Vila has done, and he has succeeded in proving that dissolution is
warranted.120

A New York court attended to the operating agreement in re
jecting dissolution in In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC.121 The com
plaint alleged that the parties were deadlocked.122 The court was
careful to distinguish the statutory standard for dissolving an LLC,
which did not explicitly include deadlock, from that for dissolving a
close corporation, which did.123 The court reasoned that
since the Legislature, in determining the criteria for dissolution
of various business entities in New York, did not cross-reference
such grounds from one type of entity to another, it would be in
appropriate for this Court to import dissolution grounds from the
Business Corporation Law or partnership Law to the LLCL.
Despite the standard for dissolution enunciated in LLCL
702, there is no definition of “not reasonably practicable” in the
context of the dissolution of a limited liability company. . . .
Such standard, however, is not to be confused with the stan
dard for the judicial dissolution of corporations . . . or
partnerships. . . .
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7-14.
Id. at *8 (footnotes omitted).
In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
Id. at 593.
See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 2003).
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Limited liability companies . . . fall within the ambit of
neither the Business Corporation Law nor the Partnership
Law.124

The court held that the statute’s reference to carrying on “in
conformity with the operating agreement” requires “initially a contract-based analysis.”125 The court refused to dissolve based solely
on the LLC’s failure to hold meetings not required by the agree
ment, or on member disagreement where the agreement provided
for action unilaterally by the manager.126 The court left open the
possibility of dissolving if the LLC is still operating, but only if it
could not realize the firm’s purpose stated in the operating agree
ment.127 Post 1545 Ocean cases in New York have been guided by
what one commentator characterized as its “contract-based
analysis.”128
It follows from the distinct contract-based nature of the judicial
dissolution remedy in LLCs that courts would refuse to characterize
LLCs as simply another kind of “incorporated partnership.” Thus,
the court in 1545 Ocean reasoned:
The LLCL . . . clarifies its scope by defining ‘limited liability com
pany’ as ‘an unincorporated organization of one or more persons
having limited liability . . . other than a partnership or trust.’
Thus, the existence and character of these various entities are
statutorily dissimilar as are the laws relating to their
dissolution.129

124. In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 596.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 597.
128. Peter H. Mahler, “The Emerging Influence of 1545 Ocean Avenue on Judicial
Dissolution of LLCs,” N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.nybusiness
divorce.com/2011/02/articles/llcs/the-emerging-influence-of-1545-ocean-avenue-on
judicial-dissolution-of-llcs/index.html. Mahler discusses three New York cases:
Mehraban v. McIntosh, Index No. 001683/09 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Jan. 19, 2011)
(granting dissolution based on financial infeasibility of achieving LLC’s business objec
tive); Matter of Singh (Data Palette Information Services, LLC), Index No. 4797/10
(Sup Ct. Queens Cnty. Jan. 7, 2011) (refusing to dissolve because of lack of showing
that LLC cannot achieve its business purpose); Matter of RBR Equities, LLC, Index
No. 40736/10 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. Jan. 18, 2011) (refusing to dissolve in light of evi
dence supporting feasibility of LLC’s achieving its business purpose).
129. In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (internal citations
omitted).
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Similarly, a federal court refused to allow an LLC member to bring
a shareholder oppression action under the New Jersey Business
Corporation Act.130
Although the contract-based approach arguably represents a
technological improvement over vague close corporation remedies,
it is not clear that all courts will sign onto this approach.131 Thus,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court characterized an LLC as
a “closely held corporate entity” and applied the Donahue-Wilkes
analysis.132 Massachusetts has heavily invested in developing this
line of cases and evidently is reluctant to discard it. This could be
viewed as an illustration of the desirable jurisdictional choice LLC
statutes offer. Whatever the apparent attractions of the contractbased approach, it is not clearly superior for all firms, including
those that seek to take advantage of a substantial body of local law
based on the corporate approach.
C. Limits of Contract: Opting Out of Judicial Dissolution
As discussed above, a statutory judicial dissolution remedy can
be an important aid to contracting given the parties’ inability to
fully specify the terms of a long-term open-ended contract such as
an LLC operating agreement. But should the parties be able to
dispense with the cost and uncertainty of a court proceeding, even
where a contract-based dissolution standard minimizes judicial in
terference with the agreement?
The Delaware Chancery Court answered this question by en
forcing an explicit contractual waiver of the judicial dissolution
remedy. The relevant operating agreement in R & R Capital, LLC
v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, provided:
130. See Casella v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 09-0421 (JAP), 2010 WL
3001919, at *4 (D.N.J., July 28, 2010); cf. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238, 250 (Del. Ch.
2010) (holding that a creditor lacks standing under the Delaware LLC act to sue an
insolvent LLC derivatively because the Delaware LLC Act explicitly prohibits such
suits).
131. Indeed, there was confusion even in some early Delaware LLC cases. Haley
v. Talcott ordered dissolution in two-member LLCs based on a Delaware corporate
provision permitting dissolution in this situation, and despite the existence of a contrac
tual buyout right. Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 96-97 (Del. Ch. 2004). In re Silver
Leaf, LLC ordered dissolution where the members were deadlocked under the operat
ing agreement, distinguishing Haley only because the firm had three members and
therefore was not eligible for relief. In re Silver Leaf, LLC, No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL
2045641, at *10, n.86 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005).
132. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Mass. 2009); Mark J. Loewen
stein, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: An Historical Perspective, 33 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 339 (2011).
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Waiver of Dissolution Rights. The Members agree that irrepara
ble damage would occur if any member should bring an action
for judicial dissolution of the Company. Accordingly each mem
ber accepts the provisions under this Agreement as such Mem
ber’s sole entitlement on Dissolution of the Company and waives
and renounces such Member’s right to seek a court decree of dis
solution or to seek the appointment by a court of a liquidator for
the Company.133

The court held that this effectively barred an action for judicial
dissolution by a member, although another clause of the agreement
permitted dissolution upon court decree in an action for a member
(that is, by the personal representative or assignee).134 This was the
first case to enforce an agreement that contemplated neither judi
cial dissolution nor arbitration.135 The court reasoned that
[t]he allure of the limited liability company . . . would be eviscer
ated if the parties could simply petition this court to renegotiate
their agreements when relationships sour. Here, the sophisti
cated members of the seven Waiver Entities knowingly, volunta
rily, and unambiguously waived their rights to petition this Court
for dissolution or the appointment of a receiver under the LLC
Act. This waiver is permissible and enforceable because it con
travenes neither the Act itself nor the public policy of the
state.136
[T]here are legitimate business reasons why members of a limited
liability company may wish to waive their right to seek dissolu
tion or the appointment of a receiver. For example, it is common
for lenders to deem in loan agreements with limited liability com
panies that the filing of a petition for judicial dissolution will con
stitute a noncurable event of default. In such instances, it is
necessary for all members to prospectively agree to waive their
rights to judicial dissolution to protect the limited liability com
133. R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC,
2008 WL 3846318, *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008). For further discussion, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Waiving Judicial Dissolution: Our Remedies Oft In Ourselves Do Lie, IDE
OBLOG (Aug. 23, 2008), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2008/08/waiving-judicia.
html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
134. R & R Capital, LLC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *8.
135. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37, § 11:5, at 96 n.31 (discussing cases
holding the parties could substitute arbitration for dissolution). R & R Capital, LLC
leaves open what types of contractual provisions constitute waivers of the judicial disso
lution remedy. For example, Lola, discussed supra notes 110-113, held that an agreement that provided for various causes of termination by the parties did not explicitly
exclude the possibility of judicial dissolution.
136. R & R Capital, 2008 WL 3846318, at *8.

R
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pany. Otherwise, a disgruntled member could push the limited
liability company into default on all of its outstanding loans sim
ply by filing a petition with this Court.137

D. Specific Duties to Members
Even without a statutory judicial dissolution remedy, courts
could give relief to oppressed minority holders for breach of a fidu
ciary or other duty to individual members. This theory might justify
remedies like those in Wilkes and Donahue.138 However, impor
tant questions concern the nature and existence of the relevant du
ties.139 Moreover, if no such duties exist, it is questionable whether
courts should, in effect, bring them in through the back door of the
oppression remedy.
1. Fiduciary Duties
Individual members may be owed fiduciary duties. However,
the fiduciary approach has limited reach. Fiduciary duties are ap
propriate only where owners delegate open-ended power over their
investments to agents.140 In this situation a duty to refrain from
self-interested conduct is justified as the best way to ensure effec
tive judicial supervision of the agent’s conduct. But owners exer
cise their voting power in the firm on their own behalf to protect
their interests against co-owners’ and managers’ selfish conduct.
Burdening owners with a duty to refrain from self-interested con
duct could undermine the self-protective function of owners’ voting
rights. Accordingly, controlling owners, acting solely as such,
should not be deemed to have a default fiduciary duty of disinter
ested conduct either to the firm or to individual owners. Owners’
conduct should be subject only to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing which, as discussed below, depends on the
rights and duties provided for in the parties’ agreement.
It is not clear whether the remedies in cases like Donahue and
Wilkes can be justified on the basis of a breach of duty by the cor
poration’s managers to minority shareholders. Some states provide
137. Id. at *7-8.
138. See Moll, supra note 91, at 910 n.96.
139. For a review of various duties courts have devised to assist minority share
holders in close corporations, and the gaps in these duties, see Judd F. Sneirson, Soft
Paternalism for Close Corporations: Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 WIS.
L. REV. 899, 904-914.
140. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209,
215.
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for duties to individual close corporation shareholders.141 Some
also clarify the existence of duties to individual LLC members.142
Massachusetts has extended its Donahue-Wilkes analysis to this
context.143
There are, however, strong arguments against creating such du
ties. First, since the fiduciary duty inherently is one to refrain from
self-interested conduct, a non-self-interested manager should not be
liable to anyone for breach of fiduciary duty even if she favored
some members over others. Courts often could face difficulties try
ing to decide which of several constituencies a non-conflicted mem
ber should have favored. For example, In re Allentown
Ambassadors, Inc. permitted a claim against a manager of a base
ball league organized as a North Carolina LLC for breaching a fidu
ciary duty to a member in part by not giving it the same
opportunities as other teams to go dark.144 It may not be clear in
such a case whether the manager should have sacrificed the league’s
interest for that of a particular member by cancelling some of the
games.
Second, any duty of managers of a closely held firm to minority
owners would indirectly be one by the controlling owners, as in
Donahue and Wilkes. Even if courts insist that the manager has a
duty to act on behalf of all the owners, the manager still will obey
those who can fire him. Moreover, as discussed above, the fiduciary
duty is one to refrain from acting self-interestedly, rather than to
act in a particular way or for a particular constituency. Even a man
ager acting for controlling owners might breach her duty by selfdealing, but the duty and remedy for breach are owed to the firm or
all of its members rather than only to the minority owners as in
Donahue and Wilkes.

141. See Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About
. . . ?, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (2011) (discussing employment and management
duties between shareholders); Sneirson, supra note 139, at 906-11.
142. Sneirson, supra note 139, at 964-65. As for recognition of duties to individ
ual members under LLC law, see Laugh Factory, Inc. v. Basciano, 608 F. Supp. 2d 549,
565 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (New York law); In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. 422,
461 (Bnkr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (although the applicable North Carolina LLC statute and
operating agreement provided for a duty only to the LLC, the court applied the duty
under North Carolina’s close corporation law); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
(RULLCA) § 409(a), (g) (2006) (providing that members and managers of LLC owe
fiduciary duties to the company and to the other members).
143. See supra text accompanying note 132.
144. In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. at 429-30.
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Even if a manager has breached a fiduciary duty to the firm,
the appropriate remedy in a closely held firm might be a suit by
individual owners rather than entrusting prosecution of the claim to
the allegedly wrongdoing managers. The derivative remedy is de
signed for publicly held firms where the owners cannot easily coor
dinate to manage the claim.145 All injured owners of a closely held
firm might be able to join a direct suit.146 Even if the shareholders
sue individually, the claim would still effectively be a joint claim on
behalf of the firm rather than one on behalf of a particular group of
(minority) shareholders.147
Apart from who can sue, the dissolution remedy differs from
the classic damage remedy in a fiduciary duty case. Dissolution ad
dresses the absence of an external market for the owner’s shares by
providing an internal market. The intimate nature of these firms
supports a default rule that bundles litigation with breakup rather
than saddling a going concern with acrimonious litigation.148 How
ever, judicial dissolution for misconduct can give a weapon to an
opportunistic minority shareholder. A less drastic damage remedy
accordingly may be more cost-effective. Bundling litigation with
dissolution is more appropriate for the intimate default general
partnership than for the more general-purpose LLC. Consistent
with these principles, the court in 1545 Ocean said that an LLC
cannot be dissolved merely because of managerial self-dealing
under the statutory contract-oriented standard discussed above un
less the conduct was “contrary to the contemplated functioning and
purpose of the limited liability company.”149 The court held that
dissolution was unnecessary where the LLC’s main business (a ren
ovation project) was close to completion and could be handled
under the existing management structure.150
Where dissolution is too drastic but damages do not provide
adequate relief the court may be tempted to order a buyout, as in
Donahue, or an equitable damages remedy such as the wages or
dered in Wilkes. Courts fashioning such remedies may have to con
145. Larry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 753-55 (2009)
[hereinafter Litigating in LLCs].
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221,
221-27 (1995).
149. In re 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, 72 A.3d 121, 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
150. Id. at 129-32.
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tend with the absence of statutory authorization.151 This result
might be defended on the ground that a dissolution order often re
sults in a buyout in any case. Ordering a buyout may give the plain
tiff less leverage to insist on a higher price depending on how the
court structures the buyout. On the other hand, assuming LLC
statutes are designed to give greater weight to the parties’ agree
ments than close corporation statutes, courts in LLC cases should
hesitate to alter statutory remedies that the parties may have relied
on.
2. Good Faith
Although fiduciary duties arguably are inappropriate in litiga
tion between controlling and minority owners, the minority may be
entitled to a remedy under the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Courts applying this doctrine provide a
remedy that is consistent with the parties’ expectations inferred
under the express terms of the agreement.152
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would not
justify relief in some prominent close corporation cases. The basic
problem in these cases, as discussed throughout this Article, is that
the parties’ attempt to combine partnership substance and corpo
rate form renders their contract incoherent. Although the courts
might purport to rely on the parties’ expectations, as discussed
above these are generalized expectations of fair treatment, not
those based on the specific deal. Close corporation oppression
gives the parties an exit right they did not bargain for and without
any clear breach of duty.
Wilkes, Donahue, and Kemp & Beatley illustrate the problems
of applying the implied good faith covenant in close corporations in
the absence of any contractual basis for relief. There was no ex
press contract at all in Donahue on which to hang the put right the
court gave to the minority shareholder. Wilkes ignored an explicit
corporate arrangement that empowered the directors to fix officer
pay and the shareholders to elect directors. Dissolution in Kemp &
Beatley could not be based on an implied contractual covenant
analysis because the parties had no contract that could reasonably
be interpreted as giving non-employees a right to distributions.
151. See, e.g., In re Superior Vending, LLC, 71 A.3d 1153, 1154 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010).
152. See Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon Ltd. P’ship,
840 F. Supp. 770, 775-77 (D. Or. 1993), aff’d, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996) (illustrating
this approach to the implied covenant).
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Plaintiffs’ claims in the recent Delaware and New York LLC
dissolution cases discussed above153 could rest more comfortably on
the implied good faith covenant. The “not reasonably practicable”
statutory standard154 assumes that the parties would not want to be
forced to continue in a contractual relationship whose agreed pur
pose had no reasonable chance of fulfillment. Moreover, the courts
apply the standard with reference to the contract the parties actu
ally made rather than their generalized expectations or the contract
they wish they could have made under better legal conditions.155 In
Fisk, Lola, 1545 Ocean, and Vila the parties were at an impasse and
the contract provided for no way out.156 In 1545 Ocean, the court
refused to let the parties out of a deal that was still viable despite
the sort of manager misconduct that might have justified judicial
dissolution of a close corporation.157 Although the plaintiffs in
these cases wanted to escape their deals, the courts made exit con
tingent on the deals they had made. In Vila, the court held that
Vila’s conduct, which plaintiff sought to make the subject of a
breach of fiduciary duty action, was covered by the contract and
therefore should be treated in a breach of contract action.158
It is important to distinguish the good faith covenant from a
cause of action based on fiduciary breach or controlling shareholder
opportunism. The reference to “good faith” is misleading, since the
remedy is based on the contract’s having a gap rather than on mor
ally blameworthy conduct. If the defendant breached a fiduciary
duty, a separate action for breach is appropriate unless the firm is
small enough to require bundling the remedy for breach with exit
or dissolution. If the defendant has not breached a fiduciary duty,
then the court should provide a remedy only if this would be consis
tent with the parties’ agreement whether or not the defendant’s
conduct could be considered unfair or grasping for some reason.
V. THE FUTURE

OF

CLOSELY HELD FIRMS

This Article has shown that LLCs represent a significant step
in the evolution of closely held firms. This step was enabled by tax
153. See supra notes 105-124 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part IV.B.
156. See supra Part IV.B.
157. In re 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC v. Crown Royal Ventures, LLC, 893
N.Y.S.2d 590, 596 (App. Ct. 2010).
158. Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, No. C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *8
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010).
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changes, which in turn spurred state legislatures and lawyers to
craft statutory standard forms and agreements that better fit the
parties’ expectations than was feasible with the close corporation.
These changes, in turn, transformed judicial dissolution into an ex
tension of the parties’ contract similar to the contractual implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in contrast to the analogous
close corporation remedy which called for courts to make up con
tracts out of parties’ general expectations. The closely held firm is
still evolving. This Part identifies some specific challenges and op
portunities raised by this Article’s analysis.
A. Judicial Dissolution Standards
We have seen that courts and legislatures are just beginning to
recognize and apply the contractual analysis in LLC cases.
Lawmakers still need to more fully recognize the fundamental dif
ferences between LLCs and close corporations regarding the im
portance and feasibility of contracting.
This fuller recognition should begin with the wider adoption of
statutory language that tracks the contract based on the DelawareNew York model. Legislatures should reject close-corporation-type
language such as that found in the Revised Uniform Limited Liabil
ity Company Act § 701(a)(5), which provides for judicial dissolu
tion based on “illegal,” “fraudulent,” or “oppressive” acts without a
clear reference to the agreement.159 Direct damage actions ade
quately address such party misconduct. In contrast, allowing mem
bers to exit via buyout or dissolution involves complex balancing of
costs and benefits that the parties need to address in their agree
ments. The legislature therefore should invite the courts to bring
those contracts to bear to the extent possible rather than focusing
on the isolated element of party misconduct. Party misconduct may
be insufficient to justify dissolution, as in 1545 Ocean, or unneces
sary given the parties’ deadlock, as in Lola and Fisk.160 The con
tractual approach also requires legislators to clarify whether the
parties should be able to waive judicial dissolution, as the Delaware
chancery court held in R & R.161
159. RULLCA § 701(a)(4), like several other LLC statutes, combines this lan
guage with “not reasonably practicable” grounds. See supra note 94 and accompanying
text (summarizing LLC statutory provisions). The presence of this contractual standard
in the section reinforces the notion that the subsection (5) ground does not depend on
the contract.
160. See supra subpart IV.B. (discussing these cases).
161. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE210.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 31

EVOLUTION OF THE CLOSELY HELD FIRM

27-SEP-11

10:19

561

Even if the statutes clearly provide that the contract controls,
the courts must decide whether and to what extent the parties have
waived or limited the statute in particular agreements. Fisk and
Lola, for example, refused to force the parties to use voluntary
buyout provisions as an alternative to seeking judicial dissolu
tion.162 This suggests that the parties can avoid judicial dissolution
only by either explicitly waiving it as in R & R or by providing that
contractual buyout or termination is the exclusive way to end the
relationship. The courts might relax the standard and, for example,
hold that the parties have implicitly opted out of dissolution if they
provided for extensive conflict resolution procedures even if they
have not explicitly made these procedures exclusive.
An additional question concerns the future of the oppression
remedy in close corporations. The parties’ ability to choose the
LLC form arguably reduces the need for an oppression remedy in
close corporations. This Article has shown that the LLC con
tracting technology significantly reduced the need for broad judicial
relief that effectively rewrites the parties’ contract. However, this
does not necessarily mean that contracting parties should be pun
ished for not choosing the correct contract or standard form, since
that would involve a possibly unwarranted assumption about the
feasibility of careful planning in closely held firms.163 The close cor
poration form might be preserved as part of the menu of con
tracting choices for unsophisticated parties who need special
judicial help. The long run need for this option will depend on the
continued evolution of LLC statutes and case law.
B. Improving Contracting Technology
This Article has characterized judicial dissolution as a contrac
tual mechanism for responding to unforeseeable changes where
owners cannot cheaply exit via sale of their shares. Because LLCs
provided an alternative to the close corporation, courts’ role in judi
cial dissolution cases can shrink. LLCs have not, however, ad
dressed all contracting problems in closely held firms. The parties
to closely held firms, as with all long-term contracts, always will
162. See supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
163. Although it is questionable that altering or restricting contracts appropri
ately addresses any such contracting problems, these issues are beyond the scope of this
Article. See Means, supra note 95, at 1199 (arguing that parties’ ability to choose the
LLC form should not restrict the availability of the oppression remedy).
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need some judicial help dealing with contracting gaps. The LLC is
only one of many likely future developments that could affect judi
cial remedies. The following subsections discuss other develop
ments that might affect the need for and nature of judicial
assistance in closely held firms.
1. More Statutes
One mechanism for additionally improving contracting in
closely held firms is to offer more standard forms. LLCs currently
are an open-ended standard form used by widely varying firms.
Delaware law contemplates that parties will do a lot of tailoring,
which invites many contractual loose ends.
Additional standard forms would enable closely held firms to
economize on contracting costs by finding default rules that better
fit their needs. For example, professional firms, very small general
partnership-type firms, and startups considering eventually going
public could have their own standard forms.
Choice-of-law rules in the U.S. address some of the need for
more standard forms by enabling firms to choose a business associa
tion law from any of the fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions and count on
having that law enforced in every other jurisdiction. As discussed
above, U.S. jurisdictions compete at least to the extent of trying to
keep the larger local firms from organizing under Delaware law.
Although there is little direct evidence that these efforts have paid
off in more formations for the more innovative states,164 jurisdic
tional choice has spurred legislative innovations.
Even robust jurisdictional choice may not have produced an
optimal number of forms. There may be many more ways to deal
with the problems addressed by oppression and buyout remedies
than statutes now provide. For example, statutes might “nudge”
the parties toward more suitable contracts.165 The optimal number
of default rules depends on a variety of factors, particularly includ
ing lawyers’ and courts’ ability to produce an adequate “network”
of form agreements, interpretations and case law to fully utilize the
forms.166 Although additional forms may have a declining marginal
value, it is difficult to determine the point at which the production
164. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 85 (discussing the evidence that large
LLC’s are typically forming in Delaware, similar to large corporations).
165. See Sneirson, supra note 139, at 915-18.
166. See Larry E. Ribstein, Making Sense of Entity Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW.
1023, 1027-28 (2003).
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of new standard forms should stop. New forms always will be nec
essary to keep up with changes in the contracting environment, and
the value of a particular new form is rarely clear at the time it is
promulgated. For example, the LLC seemed to have little value
from the time Wyoming first introduced it in 1977 until the tax
changes thirteen years later. Moreover, even if new forms may
have little value, unsuccessful innovations may not impose substan
tial costs.167
A potential problem with relying solely on state legislatures to
produce new forms is that they may not have very strong incentives
to innovate. Individual state legislators capture little of the reward
from investing the time and effort necessary for crafting a standard
form and having it enacted, may have many more valuable rentseeking opportunities, and risk harm to their reputations from un
successful or unexpectedly costly statutes.168 Lawyers and bar
groups have done much of the work in innovating standard forms
and stand to earn rewards from capturing reputational benefits of
spearheading legislation and creating increased legal business in
their home states.169 But lawyers have incentives to benefit them
selves at the expense of contracting parties, face free-rider
problems in proposing legislation, and must make tradeoffs be
tween the time they spend earning current fees and the time they
invest in legislation. It follows that there is room for a better sys
tem of producing new private or statutory standard forms. Pos
sibilities include strengthening currently weak intellectual property
rights for privately generated standard forms.170

167. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Anteced
ents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 857-60 (1995).
168. For discussions of legislators’ incentives to innovate, see Stephen Clowney,
Property in Law, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming); Brian D. Galle & Joseph Kieran Leahy,
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 1333 (2009); Gillian
Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 414, 416-19 (2006); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as
Byproduct: Theories of Private Law Production 3-5, 13 (Univ. of Cal. eScholarship,
Working Paper, 2001) [hereinafter Law as Byproduct], available at http://escholarship.
org/uc/item/9mg4g1dn; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Fed
eralism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 593, 593-96 (1980).
169. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licens
ing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 330-37 (2004).
170. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution
25 (Univ. of Ill. College of Law, Working Paper No. LBSS11-03, 2011), forthcoming 53
ARIZ. L. REV. no. 4 (2011); Law as Byproduct, supra note 168, at 25-27.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE210.txt

564

unknown

Seq: 34

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

10:19

[Vol. 33:531

2. Better Lawyering
Another way to improve closely held firm contracting technol
ogy is through better lawyering both in advising on choice of law
and form and crafting customized agreements. Some of the sticki
ness of the close corporation might be due to lawyers’ unwillingness
to invest the time in learning about new contracting technologies as
long as they can convince clients to stick with existing forms. More
over, the case law on application and interpretation of LLC agree
ments indicates significant problems with the state of the drafting
art, although the case law obviously is skewed toward problematic
agreements. Increasing competition in the legal profession171 may
address these lawyering problems and lead to more innovation of
legal tools.
3. Private Adjudication
Dissolution remedies so far have been fashioned by public
courts. The spread and development of arbitration and other pri
vate dispute resolution172 may affect both contracting and adjudica
tion in closely held firms. Parties turning to arbitration may also
turn to private forms and rely less on state-provided standard
forms. Arbitration also may reduce the amount of case law availa
ble, thus reducing the benefits of using publicly provided standard
forms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wilkes and similar close corporation cases are products of an
earlier time when closely held firms lacked sophisticated and coher
ent contracting technology and therefore needed significant judicial
assistance to fill the significant gaps in their contracts. The corpo
rate tax and constraints on the availability of limited liability forced
closely held firms to compromise their various planning objectives.
Many firms, like Springside Nursing, ended up trapped in a form
that did not suit their needs. Yet just as the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court was deciding Wilkes, the faraway Wyoming legisla
ture was inventing a solution—a new business form called the lim
ited liability company that has since swept the country. The ending
of the age of the close corporation calls for new judicial approaches.
171. See Larry E. Ribstein, Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 810-11
(2010).
172. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET
ch. 5 (2009).
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Future developments are likely to have similar effects. Judicial
opinions and statutes should fully reflect these changes in the legal
environment of closely held firms.

